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Ex–Dividend Day Price and Volume:
The Case of 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
Abstract - We examine the impact of the 2003 dividend tax cut,
which removes the differential taxation between dividends and capital gains for individual investors, on the ex–dividend day price and
trading volume. We find the ex–dividend day price and volume are
affected by taxes, risk, and transaction costs. The ex–dividend day
price drop ratio (excess return) increases (decreases) and dividend
clienteles weaken after the tax cut. Ex–dividend day abnormal
volume among high dividend yield stocks decreases after the tax cut
consistent with a diminished motivation for tax–induced trading.
Our results suggest that individual investors have a measurable
effect on the ex–dividend day price and trading volume.
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n May 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into
law the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2003 (hereafter 2003 Act). The 2003 Act creates lower
dividend and capital gains tax rates for individual investors.1
Dividends were previously taxed at the ordinary income tax
rate applicable to each taxpayer. However, under the 2003 Act,
dividends received by an individual shareholder are taxed at
the same rates that apply to capital gains. By removing the
preferential tax treatment of capital gains over dividends for
individuals, the 2003 Act provides a unique and signiﬁcant
event to study the impact of taxes and individual investors
on the ex–dividend day stock price and trading behavior.
Research has focused extensively on ex–dividend day
stock behavior. However, there is no consensus on the
explanation for the widely documented phenomenon that
the ex–dividend day price drops by less than the amount
of the dividend. The tax–based explanation attributes this
phenomenon to the preferential taxation of capital gains

1

Previously, assets held for more than one year were generally taxed at a
maximum net capital gains rate of 20 percent (ten percent for taxpayers in the
ten and 15 percent tax bracket). A lower rate of 18 percent (eight percent for
taxpayers in the ten and 15 percent tax brackets) applied to capital gains on
assets held for more than ﬁve years (qualiﬁed ﬁve–year capital gains). Under
the 2003 Act, the maximum net capital gains tax for assets held for more than
one year was lowered from 20 to 15 percent (and from ten to ﬁve percent for
taxpayers in the ten or 15 percent tax bracket). These new rates apply to sales
and exchanges and payments received on or after May 6, 2003.
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February 2001 and December 2005. By
beginning our analysis in February 2001,
we avoid the change in the market microstructure and transaction costs associated
with stocks converting to decimal quotations through the end of January 2001.
We also attempt to address whether individual investors have a signiﬁcant effect
on ex–dividend price behavior around the
2003 dividend tax cut.
Our results support the tax–based
explanation for ex–dividend day price
and trading behavior. With the removal
of the preferential taxation for capital
gains over dividends, the ex–dividend
day PDR increases and moves toward
one while the excess return decreases and
moves toward zero. Our results show the
dividend clienteles, either in the form of
long–term buy and hold clienteles in the
model of Elton and Gruber (1970) or in the
form of trading clienteles in the model of
Michaely and Vila (1995), weaken after
the 2003 Act. Also with the reduction of
the tax heterogeneity among investors,
ex–dividend day abnormal trading volume among high dividend yield stocks
signiﬁcantly decreases after the 2003 Act
consistent with a diminished motivation
for tax–induced trading.
We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects associated
with transaction costs on the ex–dividend
day PDR, excess return and trading volume and risk on the ex–dividend day PDR,
and trading volume. These ﬁndings are
consistent with predictions of the dynamic
tax–motivated trading clientele model of
Michaely and Vila (1995). Furthermore,
given that the 2003 Act only changes the
tax rates for individual investors and not
tax–exempt institutional investors or corporate investors, our results suggest that
individual investors have a measurable
effect on the ex–dividend day stock price
and trading behavior.
Our study contributes to the literature
in the following ways. First, we are among
the few to analyze the recent tax cut and its

over dividends. Elton and Gruber (1970)
proposed the tax clientele theory that the
ex–dividend day price drop ratio (PDR)
reflects the relative tax rates between
dividends and capital gains. Extending
the tax clientele theory, Michaely and Vila
(1995) propose the dynamic trading clientele theory which argues that investors
with differential tax–induced valuation
of dividends and capital gains trade with
each other around the ex–dividend day, so
as to determine the ex–dividend day price
and trading volume. The dynamic trading
clientele theory combines tax motivations,
transaction costs, and the risk tolerance of
investors. Two alternative explanations
that challenge the tax–based explanation
include the short–term arbitrage theory
proposed by Kalay (1982). He argues that
arbitrageurs dominate the market and
exploit any difference between the ex–
dividend day price and the dividend such
that any difference remaining is equal to
transaction costs. Because arbitrageurs
dominate the market in the short–term
trading theory, tax changes that impact
only individuals would not be predicted
to impact the ex–dividend day PDR. Secondly, market microstructure arguments
suggest that price discreteness (e.g., Bali
and Hite, 1998) or bid–ask bounce (e.g.,
Frank and Jagannathan, 1998) causes the
ex–dividend day price drop to be less than
the dividend.
Our paper attempts to determine the
role of taxes and individual investors
in the determination of stock prices and
trading volume around the ex–dividend
day. We analyze the ratio of price drop
to dividend on the ex–dividend day, the
excess return and trading volume around
the ex–dividend day before and after the
2003 Act. We examine stocks that pay
regular taxable cash dividends, excluding
closed–end funds, unit investment trusts,
exchange traded funds (ETFs), American
depository receipts (ADRs), and real
estate investment trusts (REITs), between
106
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describes our data and empirical methodology. The third section presents our
empirical results and the fourth section
concludes the study.

associated effects on both the ex–dividend
day price formation and tax–motivated
trading activities around the ex–dividend
day in a comprehensive setting. Although
other studies analyze the 2003 dividend
tax cut, many focus on the tax cut’s impact
on corporate dividend payouts or the
markets reaction to the dividend tax cut
(e.g., Amromin, Harrison, and Sharpe,
2006; Auerbach and Hassett, 2006; Chetty
and Saez, 2006; and Howton and Howton,
2006). An exception is Chetty, Rosenberg,
and Saez (2007) who analyze the effect of
the 2003 dividend tax cut on ex–dividend
day price and excess returns, but do not
examine trading volume. Cloyd, Li, and
Weaver (2006) focus on both the effect of
price discreteness and the 2003 tax cut on
excess returns and trading volume, but
their post–Act time period is very short,
ending in December of 2003. If individual
investor taxes impact security prices,
excess returns, and trading volume,
this, in turn, can affect various facets of
corporate ﬁnance, governmental revenue
collection, and financial investments.
Second, our study provides additional
empirical support for the tax–motivated
trading clientele model of Michaely and
Villa (1995). Lastly, our study suggests
that tax laws that inﬂuence the relative
taxation of individual investors affect
individual investors’ trading behavior
and the price formation of dividend paying stocks.
This paper is organized as follows.
The first section describes the related
literature regarding the ex–dividend day
PDR, excess return and trading volume,
and develops our hypotheses on the effect
of the 2003 tax cut on the ex–dividend
day market behavior. The second section
2

3

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that
when a stock goes ex–dividend, its price
theoretically should drop by the amount of
the dividend. However, empirical research
has widely documented that the price drop
is less than the amount of the dividend.2
There are many explanations for this phenomenon, including the differential tax
treatment of capital gains and dividends.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) ﬁrst propose the idea of dividend clienteles. They
argue that while dividend policy may be
irrelevant in determining a corporation’s
value, in imperfect capital markets in which
dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, investors could form “clienteles”
so that investors in high tax brackets hold
low dividend yield stocks, while investors
in low tax brackets hold high dividend
yield stocks. Elton and Gruber (1970) argue
that differential taxation of dividends and
capital gains affects the behavior of prices
on the day stocks pay dividends. In their
model, marginal investors are long–term
investors, who should be indifferent
to selling on the cum–dividend day or
ex–dividend day.3 In equilibrium, ignoring
transaction costs and risk, the PDR reﬂects
the ratio of differential tax rates between
dividends and capital gains:
[1]

PDR =

Pcum − Pex 1 − td
=
1 − tc
D

where

See for example, Campbell and Beranek (1955), Elton and Gruber (1970), Kalay (1982), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983), Barclay (1987), Karpoff and Walkling (1990).
As described by Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1984), at the time of the original Elton and Gruber (1970) analysis,
transaction costs were sufﬁciently high to ensure that short–term traders were not setting equilibrium prices
on the ex–dividend day.
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versus nontaxable closed–end funds. They
ﬁnd the PDR for nontaxable closed–end
funds is larger than one, which is consistent with the prediction of the tax theory
as dividend tax rates are lower than capital
gains tax rates.
Several studies extend the work of Elton
and Gruber (1970), to investigate how the
interaction of taxes, transaction costs, and
risk affects ex–dividend day price and
volume. Michaely and Vila (1995) develop
a dynamic model where ex–dividend day
price and volume is a function of tax heterogeneity among traders, aggregate risk
tolerance and risk of the individual stock
around the ex–dividend day. Investors
with differential tax–induced valuation
of dividends and capital gains trade
with each other around the ex–dividend
day which can generate higher volume,
higher excess return and a PDR less than
one. In the Michaely and Vila model, the
PDR reﬂects the relative tax rates of all
market participants, not just the marginal
trader’s:

Pcum is the cum–dividend day price,
P ex is the expected ex–dividend day
price,
D is the dividend amount,
td is the dividend tax rate and
tc is the capital gains tax rate.
The tax effect on the ex–dividend day
share price can also be expressed in terms
of excess return. The ex–dividend day
realized return is equal to
[2]

Pex + D − Pcum ⎛ Pcum − Pex ⎞
= ⎜1−
⎟
⎝
Pcum
D ⎠
×

D
D
t −t
= d c*
Pcum 1 − tc Pcum

as implied by the static tax clientele model
of Elton and Gruber (1970). The excess
return for the ex–dividend day is the
realized daily return subtracted from the
expected return.
Many studies have used changes in tax
laws to test the tax clientele theory (or
long–term trading hypothesis) of Elton
and Gruber (1970). Evidence supporting the tax effect is provided by several
studies, e.g., Barclay (1987), Robin (1991),
Lasfer (1995), Koski (1996), Lamdin and
Hiemstra (1993), Poterba and Summers
(1984), Bell and Jenkinson (2002), and Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003). However, Michaely (1991) ﬁnds the 1986 Tax
Reform has no effect on the ex–dividend
day price behavior. Michaely argues that
individual investors are less inﬂuential
while institutional and corporate traders
play a more signiﬁcant role on the ex–dividend day price behavior when transaction
costs are lower. If the marginal investor
is the corporate investor, who has preferential taxation of dividends over capital
gains, then the PDR should be greater
than one. Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984) ﬁnd
evidence consistent with the tax clienteles
if the marginal investors are corporations.
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005) revisit the
tax clientele theory by studying taxable

[3]

E( PDR) = α −

X(σ e2 / K )
ν
=α −
D
D/ P

− is the average of investors’ relawhere α
tive tax preference of dividend to capital
gains weighted by their risk tolerance; X is
the aggregate demand for securities on the
ex–dividend day; σe2 is the ex–dividend
day variance; K is the aggregate risk tolerance and ν is the risk premium.
Michaely and Vila (1995) also show that
trading volume around the ex–dividend
day is positively related to tax heterogeneity and negatively related to transaction
costs and risk resulting from the deviation from an otherwise optimal portfolio.
Empirical support for the dynamic tax–
motivated trading hypothesis is provided
by Michaely and Murgia (1995), Michaely
and Vila (1996), Wu and Hsu (1996), and
Dhaliwal and Li (2006).
Alternatively, the short–term trading
theory is based on the premise that market pricing is dominated by short–term
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the 2003 dividend tax cut, dividends are
taxed more heavily than capital gains for
individual investors. Individual investors,
therefore, prefer capital gains to dividends
while tax–exempt institutional investors
are indifferent between dividends and
capital gains, and corporate investors
prefer dividends to capital gains. The
2003 Act increases the relative tax rates on
dividends and capital gains for individual
investors while other investors’ relative
tax rates are unchanged.
Because the PDR reﬂects the relative
tax rate of the marginal investor, if the
marginal investor is an individual investor, we expect the ex–dividend day PDR to
be less than one before the 2003 Act. After
the 2003 Act, tax rates for dividend and
capital gains are equal for all individual
investors. Hence equation [1] predicts that
the PDR should increase to one. However, individual investors may still face a
relative tax penalty on dividends as they
can defer capital gains causing actual
capital gains tax rates to remain lower
than dividend tax rates even after the
2003 Act.4 Thus the PDR may increase
but still remain lower than one after the
2003 Act. Equation [4] of the dynamic
trading clientele model also suggests that
as long as individual investors participate
in ex–dividend trading, the PDR should
increase after the 2003 Act. The average of
all investors’ relative tax rates increases
since the relative tax rates for individual
investors increase and the relative tax
rates for other investors such as institutional or corporate investors remain the
same after the 2003 Act. Similarly, we
expect a positive ex–dividend day excess
return before the 2003 Act and a decrease
in the excess return after the tax cut once
dividends and capital gains taxes are
equal for individual investors. This leads
to our ﬁrst hypothesis.

arbitrageurs. Kalay (1982) argues that
short–term arbitrageurs would exploit
any difference between the ex–dividend
day price drop and the dividend until they
are approximately equal. If transaction
costs are zero, the ex–dividend day PDR
should be equal to one since arbitrageurs
have the same tax rate on their short–term
capital gains as on dividends. If transaction costs are small, by assuming a simple
form, the PDR should be bounded around
one as
[4]

1−

αP
αP
≤ PDR ≤ 1 +
D
D

–
where α P is the expected transaction
cost of “a round trip.” Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1983), Karpoff and Walkling
(1988), Boyd and Jagannathan (1994), and
Wu and Hsu (1996) provide support for
this explanation.
An alternative microstructure explanation includes Bali and Hite (1998) who
argue that the stock price drops less than
the dividend because of price discreteness
rather than taxes. Frank and Jagannathan
(1998) argue that bid–ask bounce contributes to a price drop that is less than the
dividend. However, Graham et al. (2003)
and Jakob and Ma (2004) examine the effect
of changes in price quotation and ﬁnd no
support for the microstructure explanation.
Cloyd et al. (2006) show that both price
discreteness and differential taxation affect
ex–dividend day price behavior.
The 2003 Act signiﬁcantly lowers the
dividend tax rate and removes the preferential taxation of capital gains over
dividends for individual investors. Hence
the examination of the impact of the
2003 Act on the ex–dividend day share
price, excess return, and volume behavior provides an opportunity to further
examine the tax–based theories. Before
4

Chay, Choi, and Pontiff (2006) ﬁnd investors are compensated seven cents in unrealized gains for each dollar
of realized capital gains, that is, one dollar of realized capital gains is equivalent to 93 cents of unrealized
gains.
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Hypothesis 2b: The ex–dividend day
excess return should be positively correlated with the dividend yield before
the 2003 Act and the correlation should
weaken or disappear after the 2003 Act.

Hypothesis 1a: The PDR for dividend
paying stocks should increase after the
2003 Act and become closer to one.
Hypothesis 1b: The ex–dividend day
excess return for dividend paying stocks
should decrease after the 2003 Act and
become closer to zero.

The dynamic trading clientele theory
predicts a large abnormal volume (AV)
around the ex–dividend day. Also tax–
induced trading around the ex–dividend
day results from the differential valuations
of dividends versus capital gains among
market participants. Because the 2003
Act not only removes the tax heterogeneity among individual investors, but also
aligns the tax differential of individual
investors with institutional investors and
arbitrageurs, the gains of trading become
smaller. With the reduction of tax–induced
trading motives, ex–dividend day trading
volume should decrease. This leads to our
third hypothesis.

The dividend clientele theory states
that investors in high (low) tax brackets
will prefer low (high) dividend paying stocks when there is preferential
taxation of capital gains to dividends.
Thus, the implied relative tax rates for
marginal investors should decrease with
dividend yields. As the PDR reﬂects the
marginal investor’s tax rate, it should be
an increasing function of dividend yield.
When the tax differential for individual
investors disappears (or weakens due to
the deferability of capital gains) after the
2003 Act, equation [1] predicts that the
dividend clientele effect will disappear
(or weaken). However, to the extent that
transaction costs are important and
dividend yield proxies transaction costs,
the relation between the PDR and the
dividend yield becomes uncertain. As
dividend yield increases, more individual investors can participate in the
ex–dividend day trading due to the lower
transaction costs, which will change the
aggregate average relative tax rate.5 Thus,
the relation between the PDR (or excess
return) and dividend yield becomes an
empirical question. Our second hypothesis follows.

Hypothesis 3: The trading volume around
the ex–dividend day should decrease after
the 2003 Act.
Transaction costs play an important
role in trading behavior. Trading around
the ex–dividend day may be unproﬁtable
when traders face large transaction costs.
Since low dividend yield stocks have relatively higher transaction costs than high
dividend yield stocks, stocks with a high
dividend yield are more likely to show a
signiﬁcant amount of tax–induced trading
around the ex–dividend day. Hence, we
expect the decrease in the ex–dividend
day trading volume to be more signiﬁcant for high dividend yield stocks. Risk,
just like transaction costs, discourages
trading around the ex–dividend day. As
implied by the dynamic trading model of
Michaely and Vila (1995), trading volume
is a decreasing function of transaction costs

Hypothesis 2a: The PDR should be positively correlated with the dividend yield
before the 2003 Act and the correlation
should weaken or disappear after the
2003 Act.
5

See Cloyd et al. (2006) for further discussions of how the positive relation between dividend yield and ex–day
abnormal returns may be mitigated by heterogeneous tax rates across investors.
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stocks had converted their price quotations
to decimals.9 Thus, we choose February
2001 as the starting point of our study to
avoid the possible effect of the change in
the market microstructure. We eliminate
year 2003 as the transition year since there
may be a lag in investors’ restructuring of
their portfolios.10 Therefore we use 2001
(excluding January) and 2002 to represent
a distinct pre–Act period and 2004 and 2005
to represent a distinct post–Act period.
To estimate the PDR, we adopt a methodology similar to Michaely (1991). We adjust
the ex–dividend day closing price by the
expected daily return of the stock.11 We estimate the expected return using the market
model over the window –45 to –2 and +2 to
+45, where day zero is the ex–dividend day
and the market return is the value–weighted
market portfolio (including distributions).
Our event window is the same that is used
by Michaely and Vila (1995)

and risk. Therefore our last hypothesis is
as follows.
Hypothesis 4: Trading volume is positively
related to dividend yield and negatively
related to risk and transaction costs.
Given that the 2003 Act only lowers
dividend tax rates for individuals, any
signiﬁcant changes on the ex–dividend
day price behavior before and after the tax
cut would suggest that the ex–dividend
day price reﬂects individual investors’
relative tax rates on dividends and capital
gains. This would suggest that individual
investors’ preferences have a measurable
impact on ex–dividend day price formation and trading behavior.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We collect data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We
examine ﬁrms that pay taxable regular cash
dividends (distribution codes 1222, 1232,
1242, and 1252) to their common stockholders (share codes 10, 11, and 12).6 We exclude
closed–end funds, unit investment trusts,
ETFs, ADRs, and REITs because of their
different tax treatment and more complex
distributions. We eliminate observations
where the dividend was less than one
cent,7 where there was no trade on the
ex–dividend date, or the price was lower
than ﬁve dollars.8 By the end of January
2001, all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
6

7
8

9
10

11

Pi , ex
1 + E(ri )
Di

Pi , cum −
[5]

PDRi =

where
Pi,cum is the cum–dividend day closing
price for stock i,
Pi,ex is the ex–dividend day closing price
for stock i,
E(ri) is the expected daily return of stock i,
estimated by the market model, and
Di is the dividend amount for stock i.

The share and distribution codes are the same as those used for the announcement analysis in Chetty et al.
(2007).
The minimum tick size is one cent.
Following Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005) among others, we eliminate observations with prices below ﬁve
dollars because for low–priced securities, the bid/ask spread is large relative to the dividend and introduces
noise into our analysis.
See details in Graham et al. (2003).
Our data show that the PDR is extremely high in the second quarter of 2003 when the Act is enacted and the
PDRs of the third and fourth quarter of 2003 are still close to that of 2002, which implies a lag.
The natural ex–dividend price is the opening price. But the opening price is biased because all orders on the
books are adjusted by the amount of the dividend. Therefore, we use closing prices and adjust for the daily
return on the ex–dividend day (e.g., Elton et al., 2005; Lamdin and Hiemstra, 1993; and Wu and Hsu, 1996).
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Due to the large variation in our dividend distribution sample, we winsorize
the data at the 2.5 percent level to reduce
the effect of outliers.12 Furthermore, following Michaely (1991), we correct two
sources of heteroskedasticity: the security’s variance and the dividend yield effect.
The stock variance is calculated from the
market model and dividend yield is calculated as the amount of the cash dividend
divided by the cum–dividend price. As
shown in Michaely (1991), the covariance
matrix of the disturbances of ex–dividend
day PDR is

[7]

Besides the ex–dividend day, we examine returns of ten days surrounding the
ex–dividend day. Our study window is
[–5, +5], where day zero is the ex–dividend
day. We use [–45, –6] and [6, 45] as our estimation window to calculate the expected
return by the market model. We adopt the
weighted least squares with the inverse of
the standard deviation of the estimation
period return as the weight to correct for
heteroskedasticity.
Following Michaely and Vila (1995),
risk is measured by the variance of the
security’s return scaled by the variance of
the market returns during the estimation
period of the market model. Similar to
Michaely and Vila (1996), we use market
capitalization on the cum–dividend day as
a proxy for transaction costs. Our assumption is that large–capitalization stocks are
more liquid and have lower transaction
costs. To reduce the effect of outliers, we
specify the variable as the natural logarithm of market capitalization.
Similar to Michaely and Vila (1995)
and Graham et al. (2003), we measure
trading volume by stock turnover. Daily
turnover is deﬁned as the ratio of daily
shares traded to shares outstanding. We
compute the average turnover from the
average daily turnover for days –45 to –6
and +6 to +45

if i = j
otherwise

⎧⎪σ 2 / di2
Ωij = ⎨ i
⎪⎩ 0

where σi2 is the variance of stock i, estimated from the market model, and di is
the dividend yield on stock i.
So the mean PDR is calculated using
weighted least squares where:
n

[6]

PDR =

∑ (d

2
i

/ σ i2 ) × PDRi

i =1

n

∑ (d

2
i

.
/ σ i2 )

i =1

In addition, we use the median of the
PDR since the price drop ratio may not be
normally distributed. The Wilcoxon sign
test is used to test the median difference
from one and Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney
test is used to test the difference in the
PDR before and after the 2003 Act. The
two–sided p–value is reported in the
tables.
We also analyze the ex–dividend day
excess returns to further examine the
ex–dividend day price behavior. We calculated the ex–dividend day excess return
on stock i as

12

Pi , ex + Di − Pi , cum
− E(ri ) .
Pi , cum

[8]

ATOi =

∑

t ∈[ −45 , −6 ]∪[ +6 , +45]

TOit

T

where TOit is the daily turnover for security i on day t, and T is the number of days
with valid volume observations in the estimation period. Then for each day in the

Graham et al. (2003) trim the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles of premium to reduce the effect of outliers in their
analysis. As an alternative to winsorizing our data, we trim the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles and the results
are qualitatively the same as those reported in the paper.
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event window [–5, +5], we calculate the
AV as the difference between the stock’s
actual to average turnover, relative to the
average turnover:
[9]

AVit =

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We begin by providing some overall
statistics regarding the dividend behavior of ﬁrms (share codes 10–12) tracked
by CRSP (distribution codes 1222, 1232,
1242, and 1252) between the period 2001
and 2005 in Table 1.13 We eliminate ﬁrms
paying less than a one–cent regular
dividend and ﬁrms with a stock price
lower than ﬁve dollars. Based on these
restrictions, the number of ﬁrms paying
regular dividends has increased from
1,751 ﬁrms in 2001 to 1,898 ﬁrms in 2005.
The number of dividend initiations and
the number of ﬁrms continuing to pay
dividends has similarly increased over the
period with a corresponding decline in the
number of ﬁrms discontinuing dividends.
Most dramatically, the number of ﬁrms
initiating dividends more than doubled
between 2002 and 2003 (102 to 215) and the
number of ﬁrms discontinuing dividends
went from 310 in 2001 to 119 in 2003.14
We also document an increasing average
annual dividend per share which during
the pre–Act period was 0.536 and 0.546

TOit − ATOi
ATOi

The mean daily AV for the sample is
computed as
N

[10]

AVt =

∑ AV

it

i =1

N

t ∈[−5, +5]

We also compute the cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of 11 days around the
ex–dividend day. The mean of CAV is calculated in the same way as the mean of AV.
T–statistics for the volume are calculated
using the cross–sectional estimates of the
variance of abnormal volume. Given that
the daily turnover data is highly skewed,
we winsorize the daily AV data at the 2.5
percent level. Data with missing or negative trading volume are deleted from the
sample.

TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND PAYMENT
Number of ﬁrms paying dividends
Number of ﬁrms initiating dividends
Number of ﬁrms discontinuing dividends
Number of ﬁrms continuing dividends
Number of ﬁrms increasing dividends
Number of ﬁrms with no change in dividends
Number of ﬁrms decreasing dividends
Average annual dividend amount per share
Percentage change in dividend
Average annual dividend yield

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

1,751
112
310
1639

1,661
102
192
1559

1,757
215
119
1542

1,847
190
100
1657

1,898
181
130
1717

707
798
134

619
798
142

715
684
143

844
678
135

898
659
160

0.536
1.13%
2.57%

0.546
1.87%
2.47%

0.547
0.18%
2.36%

0.560
2.38%
2.11%

0.583
4.11%
2.16%

Note: This table provides summary of ﬁrms (share codes 10–12) paying regular dividends (distribution codes 1222,
1232, 1242, and 1252) between 2001 and 2005. Firms paying lower than one–cent dividend or with price lower
than ﬁve dollars are eliminated. Percentage change in dividend is calculated as (average annualized dividend
per sharet – average annualized dividend per sharet–1)/average annualized dividend per sharet.

13

14

We eliminate share codes for closed–end funds, unit investment trusts, ETFs, ADRs, REITs, and distribution
codes for unknown, unspeciﬁed, special, interim, and non–recurring dividends.
Our results appear consistent with Chetty and Saez (2006) who provide detailed analyses of the effect of the
dividend tax cut on overall corporate payout policy.
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in 2001 and 2002, respectively, while the
average annual dividend per share during
the post–Act period was 0.560 and 0.583
in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
Table 1 shows that the composition of
ﬁrms paying dividends across time may
be changing substantially. Chetty and Saez
(2006) also ﬁnd that the 2003 Act induced
many ﬁrms to initiate dividend payments.
To avoid introducing a composition bias
into the sample, we restrict the remainder
of our analysis to ﬁrms that pay dividends
in all four years of the pre– and post–Act
periods that results in a sample of 1,278
ﬁrms. Firms may change the amount or frequency of distribution of dividends during
the pre– and post–Act periods, however.15

PDR AND EXCESS RETURN ANALYSIS
Next we turn our focus to Table 2, Panel
A where we present descriptive statistics
for the ex–dividend day PDR for each of
the four years around the 2003 Act. Unless
otherwise noted, all results reported for
the PDR are based on the winsorized
data to reduce the effect of outliers caused
by the large variation in the PDR that
arises from a large price change or a tiny
dividend. First we note that there are 4,318
and 4,713 dividend distribution events
in 2001 and 2002, respectively, while the
number of payouts is 4,772 and 4,677 in
2004 and 2005, respectively. Although we
restrict the analysis to 1,278 ﬁrms that pay

TABLE 2
EX–DIVIDEND DAY PDR
Panel A: PDR for Taxable Quarterly Dividends
Year
Median
(Sign test p value)
Mean
(t–stat)
Min
Max
S.D
Sample size

2001

2002

2004

2005

0.510***
(0.00)
0.653***
(9.68)
–18.81
20.61
6.68
4,318

0.613***
(0.00)
0.645***
(11.14)
–16.13
18.24
5.81
4,713

0.763***
(0.00)
0.857***
(5.92)
–13.37
14.63
4.64
4,772

0.757***
(0.00)
0.870***
(5.65)
–13.90
14.67
4.62
4,677

Panel B: Difference in PDR

Median
(Wilcoxon p value)
Mean
(t–stat)
Sample size

Pre–Act

Post–Act

Post–Pre

Difference
(02–01)

Difference
(05–04)

0.562***
(0.00)
0.648***
(14.74)
9,031

0.759***
(0.00)
0.864***
(8.17)
9,449

0.197***
(0.00)
0.215***
(7.40)
18,480

0.105***
(0.04)
–0.009
(–0.18)
9,031

–0.006
(0.50)
0.012
(0.37)
9,449

Notes:
PDR is deﬁned as the cum–dividend day closing price minus the ex–dividend day closing price (adjusted by
the expected daily return) divided by the dividend amount. The expected daily return is estimated using the
market model with estimation period [–45, –6] and [6, 45]. The market return is deﬁned as the return of the
value–weighted market portfolio including distributions. The mean has been corrected for two sources of heteroskedasticity: the security’s variance and the dividend yield effect. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. The
sample includes taxable dividend payments (distribution codes 1222, 1232, 1242, and 1252) of common stocks
(share codes 10–12) in 2001 (excluding January), 2002, 2004, and 2005. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to
December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. Wilcoxon sign test p–values
are reported for testing the median equal to one and t–statistics are reported for testing the mean equal to one. In
Panel B, Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test two side p–values are reported for testing the difference in the medians
equal to zero and t–statistics are reported for testing the difference in the means equal to zero.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
15

To determine the sensitivity of our results to requiring ﬁrms to pay dividends over all four years of the pre– and
post–Act period, we estimate all of our model speciﬁcations with the full sample of ﬁrms that meet the share
and distribution code requirements. Our results are qualitatively the same as those reported unless otherwise
noted in the paper.

114

Ex–Dividend Day Price and Volume: The Case of 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
hypothesis. Absent any shift in the market
microstructure such as price discreteness
or bid–ask bounce, the structural change
in the PDR is associated with the dividend
tax cut. Therefore, our data support the
tax–based theory on the ex–dividend day
price behavior. The relative taxation of
dividends and capital gains does affect
the ex–dividend day price behavior of
stocks.
One potential limitation to our analysis
is that we analyze a short–window around
the reform. Chetty et al. (2007) perform a
similar analysis of the PDR around the
2003 Act and ﬁnd that although the PDR
does rise signiﬁcantly after the Act, the
magnitude of the increase is in large part
due to the unusually low value of the PDR
during the 2000–2002 period. They argue
that there is a time series pattern in the
PDR that appears to be unrelated to taxes.
To address this concern, we calculate the
PDR for 1998 and 1999 since this period
captures a similar dividend tax regime
as in the 2001 and 2002 period. In results
not shown, we calculate the full sample
winsorized mean (median) PDR to be
0.754 (0.647) and 0.707 (0.629) for 1998 and
1999, respectively. In 2001 and 2002, we
calculate the mean (median) PDR for the
full sample to be 0.698 (0.475) and 0.671
(0.558), respectively. We do not restrict
the sample to dividend payers for the
ﬁve–year period between 2001 and 2005
since this would impose an additional
survivorship bias on the sample if we
extend this requirement back to 1998.
Consistent with the ﬁndings of Chetty
et al. (2007) and Graham et al. (2003), we
note that the mean and median PDRs in
1998 and 1999 are higher than the PDRs
in 2001 and 2002. However, in our sample
of ﬁrms, the mean and median PDR after
the 2003 Act remains signiﬁcantly higher
than the respective PDRs of 1998 and
1999. Although it appears that the PDR

dividends in all four years, our dividend
distribution sample sizes are not equal
for several reasons. First, we only capture
11 months of distributions in 2001 due
to decimalization. Second, firms may
increase or reduce the frequency of payment over the four–year period.
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, the
mean PDR is signiﬁcantly lower than one
before the tax cut: 0.653 for 2001 and 0.645
for 2002. After the 2003 Act the mean PDR
increases to 0.857 in 2004 and 0.870 in 2005.
Analyzing the medians generates similar
results. The median PDR increases from
0.510 in 2001 and 0.613 in 2002 to 0.763
in 2004 and 0.757 in 2005.16 Despite the
signiﬁcant increase in the PDR from 2002
to 2004, the PDR remains signiﬁcantly less
than one. This phenomenon may result
from individual investors’ ability to defer
capital gains which causes capital gains
tax rates to remain lower than dividend
tax rates for individual investors even
after the 2003 Act. Alternatively, a PDR
that is less than one is also consistent with
the dynamic trading model of Michaely
and Vila (1995). Even when the average
relative tax rate is one, the risk involved
in the ex–dividend day trading results in a
PDR that is less than one (see, for example,
equation [4]).
We also test the structural change in
the PDR by dividing the sample into
pre– and post–Act periods, as presented
in Panel B of Table 2. The median (mean)
PDR increases after the 2003 Act from
0.562 (0.648) to 0.759 (0.864), respectively.
The increase in both the median and
mean PDR from the pre– to post–Act
period is statistically signiﬁcant at the
one percent level. Furthermore there is no
signiﬁcant shift in the mean PDR between
2001 and 2002 or between 2004 and
2005. These results suggest a structural
change between the pre– and post–Act
periods, thus lending support to our ﬁrst
16

Our PDR calculations appear reasonable compared to Chetty et al. (2007) who document a median premium
of 0.61 in 2002 and 0.74 for 2004.
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in 2001 and 2002 is unusually low relative
to other time periods, our conclusion that
taxes have a signiﬁcant effect on the PDR
appears robust to the choice of alternative
pre–Act periods.
Similarly, Table 3 presents the excess
returns for ten days surrounding the
ex–dividend day for our four year sample
period. Consistent with the PDR results,
ex–dividend day excess returns are signiﬁcantly positive. The ex–dividend day
excess return is 0.319 percent in 2001 and
0.283 percent in 2002, and it decreases to
0.108 percent in 2004 and 0.119 percent in
2005. Consistent with Eades et al. (1984)
and other studies, we ﬁnd excess returns
are not unique for the ex–dividend day.
The ﬁve trading days before the ex–dividend day generally have positive excess
returns while the ﬁve trading days after
the ex–dividend day generally have
negative excess returns or excess returns
insigniﬁcantly different from zero. But the
excess returns of the ex–dividend day are
much larger in magnitude compared to
other trading days. These patterns can be
seen from Figure 1. Figure 1 also illustrates

that excess returns for days surrounding
the ex–day in the post–Act period are
smaller and less volatile than those in the
pre–Act period.
To examine the relation between the
dividend yield and the PDR, we perform
regressions where PDR is our dependent
variable, as shown in Table 4, Panel A.
Consistent with the predictions of the
dividend clientele theory, regression (1)
shows that there is a positive and signiﬁcant relation between dividend yield
and PDR in both the pre– and post–Act
periods. The coefﬁcient on the dividend
yield in the post–Act period is much
smaller than that in the pre–Act period,
indicating the weakening of the dividend
yield effect. Based on the dynamic trading
clientele theory, we include a proxy for
risk (σi2/ σm2) and transaction costs (log of
market capitalization) in regressions (2),
(3), and (4). Consistent with the theory,
we find a significant negative relation
between risk and a signiﬁcant positive
relation between market capitalization
and the PDR in all but one speciﬁcation
(Pre–Act) where risk is insigniﬁcant.17 In

TABLE 3
EXCESS RETURN FOR THE TEN DAYS SURROUNDING THE EX–DIVIDEND DAY
2001
Day
–5
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5

2002

2005

2004

ER(%)

t–stat

ER(%)

t–stat

ER(%)

t–stat

ER(%)

t–stat

0.041
0.017
–0.002
0.016
0.159***
0.319***
0.028
0.016
–0.062**
–0.026
0.003

1.41
0.60
–0.09
0.59
5.67
10.77
0.97
0.58
–2.21
–0.90
0.13

0.080***
0.067***
0.061**
–0.003
0.038***
0.283***
–0.037
0.038
–0.046*
0.031
–0.015

3.38
2.66
2.52
–0.14
1.59
11.33
–1.46
1.57
–1.85
1.35
–0.63

0.014
0.045**
–0.025
0.055***
0.052***
0.108***
0.010
0.002
0.043*
–0.039**
–0.012**

0.73
2.45
–1.36
3.12
2.99
6.01
0.56
0.09
1.77
–2.20
–0.68

0.018
0.044**
0.019
–0.010
0.042**
0.119***
0.047
0.018
0.027
–0.015
–0.045***

0.88
2.50
1.10
–0.48
2.13
6.54
2.76
1.04
1.51
–0.88
–2.77

Notes:
The excess return is the return above that predicted by the market model. The market return is deﬁned as the
return of the value–weighted portfolio including distributions. The estimation period for the market model is
[–45, –6] and [6, 45]. Weighted least squares are used to calculate the average excess return with the inverse of
the standard deviation of the estimation period return as the weight. Excess returns in the 11–day event window
[–5, +5] are presented (ex–dividend day = 0). T–statistics are for testing the null hypothesis that mean excess
return is zero. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January
1, 2004 to December 31, 2005.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
17

If we estimate Panel A of Table 4 for the full sample of ﬁrms without restricting the sample to dividend payers
in all four years, the risk measure becomes insigniﬁcant in the post–Act period.
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Figure 1.

Excess Return for the Ten Days Surrounding the Ex–dividend Day

shows that market capitalization has a
signiﬁcant effect on excess returns in both
pre– and post–Act periods, indicating
that transaction costs have a signiﬁcant
positive effect on ex–dividend day excess
returns. Risk, however, is insigniﬁcant in
all model speciﬁcations, consistent with
the ﬁnding of Michaely and Villa (1995).
They argue that this result is consistent
with the notion that only beta risk is
priced, as excess returns are already beta
adjusted.
We also test the structural change in
ex–dividend day excess returns before
and after the 2003 Act. The average
excess return declines after the tax cut,
as reflected in the significant negative
coefﬁcient on a post–Act dummy variable in regression (3). This result lends
further support to our ﬁrst hypothesis
that the relative taxation of dividends and
capital gains does affect the ex–dividend
day excess return behavior of stocks.
We further add the interaction term of
the dividend yield with the post–Act
dummy variable into regression (4). The
excess return is positively related to the
dividend yield, but the relation weakens
in the post–Act period, as indicated by

the pre–Act period, the dividend yield
effect is very strong, which may dominate
the effect of risk. Because stocks with large
ﬁrm size tend to have lower transaction
costs, the positive relation between the
PDR and market capitalization indicates
a negative association between transaction costs and the PDR. The 2003 Act signiﬁcantly increases the average PDR even
after controlling for dividend yield, risk,
and market capitalization, as reﬂected in
the signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on a
post–Act dummy variable in regression
(3). In column 4, we interact the dividend
yield with our post–Act dummy variable
to further determine whether dividend
clienteles weaken after the reduction in
dividend taxes for individuals. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term (–18.121) is
negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that
the dividend clienteles weaken signiﬁcantly after the 2003 Act.
We similarly analyze the relation
between dividend yield and ex–dividend
day excess returns with results reported in
Panel B of Table 4. Regression (1) shows
that the dividend yield effect is signiﬁcant
in the pre–Act period and is insigniﬁcant
in the post–Act period. Regression (2)
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TABLE 4
TESTS OF THE CHANGE IN DIVIDEND CLIENTELES
Pre–Act
(1)

Post–Act
(2)

(1)

Full Sample
(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: PDR
Intercept

0.377***
(7.71)

–0.511***
(–3.92)

0.820***
(37.39)

0.124
(1.14)

–0.166**
(–2.10)

–0.352***
(–3.97)

Yield

23.60***
(6.38)

22.312***
(6.04)

3.248***
(3.06)

4.405***
(3.98)

5.868***
(5.57)

22.542***
(6.08)

Risk

–0.016
(–0.94)

–0.014**
(–2.39)

–0.015***
(–2.71)

–0.013**
(–2.41)

Market cap

0.066***
(7.92)

0.046***
(6.93)

0.054***
(10.49)

0.054***
(10.38)

0.147***
(4.76)

0.357***
(6.56)

PostDum

–18.121***
(–4.69)

Interaction term
(Yield) × ( Dummy)
Sample size
R2

9,031
0.0045

Intercept

0.173***
(4.74)

1.106***
(9.61)

Yield

19.279***
(4.01)

10.706**
(2.18)

9,031
0.0118

9,449
0.001

18,480
0.0125

9,449
0.0078

18,480
0.0113

0.098***
(4.12)

0.546***
(6.36)

0.746***
(10.90)

0.779***
(10.63)

2.579
(0.78)

1.441
(0.43)

18.036***
(5.13 )

13.720***
(2.81 )

–0.006
(–0.54)

–0.002
(–0.60)

–0.005
(–1.34)

–0.004
(–1.15)

–0.060***
(–8.80)

–0.028***
(–5.61)

–0.039***
(–9.77)

–0.039***
(–9.69)

–19.108***
(–6.01)

–0.056
(–1.28)

Panel B: Excess Returns (%)

Risk
Market cap
PostDum

–12.825**
(–2.19)

Interaction terms
(Yield) × (Dummy)
Sample size
R2

9,031
0.0018

9,031
0.0103

9,449
0.0001

9,449
0.0034

18,480
0.0093

18,480
0.0094

Notes:
We test the change in dividend clienteles. The dependent variable of regressions in Panel A is the PDR. Weighted
least squares are utilized to correct for heteroskedasticity with the ratio of squared dividend yield to the stock’s
variance as the weight. The dependent variable of regressions in Panel B is the ex–dividend day excess returns.
Weighted least squares are used to calculate the average excess return with the inverse of the standard deviation
of the estimation period return as the weight. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. T–statistics are in parentheses
under the parameter estimates. Dividend yield is calculated by dividing the dividend amount by the cum–dividend day closing price. Risk is measured by the variance of the security’s return scaled by the variance of the
market returns during the estimation period [–25, –6] and [6, 25]. Market cap is the natural logarithm of the
market capitalization on the cum–dividend day (i.e., cum–dividend day price multiplied by the outstanding
shares). Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004
to December 31, 2005. PostDum = 0 for pre–Act period, and 1 otherwise.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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each dividend yield group. The highest
dividend yield group has a PDR higher
than one in the post–Act period, consistent
with the notion that the marginal investor for the highest dividend yield stocks
are corporate investors. We also note that
the standard deviation decreases in the
post–Act period relative to the pre–Act
period. We graph the mean PDR of each
dividend yield group in Figure 2.19 We
illustrate that the mean PDR of each
dividend yield group after the tax change
is larger than before the tax change. The
entire PDR curve shifts up and is less
varied in the post–Act period compared
to the pre–Act period.
Contrary to the prediction of the dividend tax clientele theory that a positive
relation exists between the PDR and
the dividend yield, we ﬁnd a U–shaped
relation in the pre–Act period. As the
dividend clientele theory predicts, investors in the high tax brackets tend to hold

the statistically signiﬁcant negative coefficient of the interaction term: –12.825
percent. The results in Table 4 Panels A
and B provide support for our second
hypothesis that predicts a weakening of
the dividend clienteles.
To gain further insight into dividend
tax clienteles, we separate our sample
into four dividend yield groups based on
Graham et al. (2003) as follows (right–endpoint inclusive):18 annualized dividend
yield less than or equal to two percent,
between two and four percent, between
four and six percent, and greater than
six percent. Table 5 presents the mean
and median PDR of each dividend yield
group. In the pre–Act period, the mean
(median) PDR is signiﬁcantly lower than
one for each dividend yield group except
the highest group which has a PDR that
is insigniﬁcantly different from one. The
mean (median) PDR is higher in the post–
Act period than in the pre–Act period for

TABLE 5
PDR GROUPED BY DIVIDEND YIELD
Group

Dividend Yield (y)

N

y<=2%
2%<y<=4%
4%<y<=6%
y>6%

4,094
3,673
1,052
212

Median

S.D.

Mean

SE

8.653a
3.274c
1.826c
1.466

0.648***
0.456***
0.731***
0.958

0.077b
0.039c
0.044c
0.065

6.144
2.396c
1.196c
1.454

0.719***
0.760***
0.958
1.100**

0.049
0.026c
0.031b
0.049

Pre–Act
1
2
3
4

0.547***
0.451***
0.751***
0.998
Post–Act

1
2
3
4

y<=2%
2%<y<=4%
4%<y<=6%
y>6%

4,749
3,839
721
140

0.712***
0.686***
0.932**
1.157**

Notes:
We separate the sample into groups based on annualized dividend yields. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%].
The mean PDR is adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002;
Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. Statistical signiﬁcance for testing mean or median
PDR different from one is indicated in the table. We also test for the difference between the PDR of the dividend
yield group and the next higher dividend yield group (e.g., group 1 to group 2).
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a b
, , and c indicates statistically signiﬁcant (10%, 5%, and 1% levels) difference from the next dividend yield
group.

18

19

Graham et al. (2003) divide observations based on quarterly dividend yields into ﬁve groups: less than 0.5
percent, between 0.5 and one percent, between one and 1.5 percent, between 1.5 and 2.0 percent, and greater
than 2.0 percent. Because we have a very small number of observations with an annual dividend yield greater
than eight percent (2% × 4), we combine these observations into the fourth group.
The graph of the median PDR shows a similar pattern.
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Figure 2.

PDR by Dividend Yield Group

same dividend yield groups. We ﬁnd that
ex–dividend day excess returns for all the
dividend yield groups are signiﬁcantly
positive before the 2003 Act. After the
2003 Act, excess returns decline signiﬁcantly relative to pre–Act returns for each
dividend yield group, and the two highest
dividend yield groups have insigniﬁcant
excess returns. Figure 3 illustrates the
arch shape of the excess returns across
dividend yield groups, which corresponds
with the U–shape of the PDR depicted
in Figure 2. Low (high) dividend yield
stocks exhibit a positive (negative) relation between the excess return and the
dividend yield. Our high dividend yield
result is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert
(2000) who suggest that the clientele for
high dividend yield stocks are corporate
investors.

low dividend paying stocks, which should
lead to a low PDR. But in our sample, the
PDR of the lowest dividend yield group
(group 1—with an annual dividend yield
less than or equal to two percent) is signiﬁcantly higher than that of the next higher
dividend yield group. We are not the ﬁrst
to document such a pattern, as similar
results appear in Elton and Gruber (1970),
and Michaely (1991) among others. Elton
and Gruber (1970), however, attribute the
high PDR for the low dividend yield stocks
to the bias of the data as small dividends
drive the PDR misleadingly high or to the
large standard deviation of their results.
In our study, we winsorize the data to
reduce the impact of outliers and correct
for heteroskedasticity of the dividend
yield effect by assigning lower weights
to low dividend yield stocks. Cloyd et al.
(2006) discuss several factors which may
distort the positive relation between the
dividend yield and the ex–dividend day
PDR (or excess return). In the post–Act
period, the PDR and the dividend yield
generally exhibit a positive relation.
We ﬁnd similar results, as outlined in
Table 6, when analyzing the ex–dividend
day excess return behavior across the

ABNORMAL TRADING VOLUME
ANALYSIS
As previously hypothesized, we expect
that the trading volume around the ex–dividend day will decrease signiﬁcantly after
the 2003 Act (Hypothesis 3) and that the
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TABLE 6
EXCESS RETURN GROUPED BY DIVIDEND YIELD
Pre–Act
Group
1
2
3
4

Dividend Yield (y)

N

y<=2%
2%<y<=4%
4%<y<=6%
y>6%

4,094
3,673
1,052
212

Post–Act
ER (%)
0.142***
0.443***
0.333***
0.130

SE (%)

N

0.030c
0.029a
0.052
0.122

4,749
3,839
721
140

ER (%)
0.094***
0.163***
0.027
–0.137

SE (%)
0.019b
0.020c
0.036b
0.111

Notes:
We separate the sample into groups based on annualized dividend yields. The mean excess return is adjusted for
heteroskedasticity. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January
1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. Standard errors for the mean excess return are reported. Statistical signiﬁcance for
testing mean excess return different from zero is indicated in the table. We also test for the difference in the excess
return between the dividend yield group and the next higher dividend yield group (e.g., group 1 to group 2).
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a b
, , and c indicates statistically signiﬁcant (10%, 5%, and 1% levels) difference from the next dividend yield group.

Figure 3.

Ex–dividend Day Excess Return by Dividend Yield Group

four percent. We use four percent since
Graham et al. (2003) ﬁnd that most AV
activity occurs in stocks with quarterly
dividend yields above one percent and
argue that the result is consistent with
greater dividend capture activity where
the payoff to such activity is highest.
Analyzing the full sample results in
Table 7, Panel A, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive AV for most of the 11 days around the
ex–dividend day and AV is much higher

trading volume will be positively related
to dividend yield and negatively related
to risk and transaction costs (Hypothesis
4). Thus, to analyze tax–induced trading
around the ex–dividend day, we estimate
abnormal trading volume for ten days
surrounding the ex–dividend day for the
pre– and post–Act period. We also analyze abnormal trading volume for high
dividend yield stocks that we deﬁne as
an annualized dividend yield greater than
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TABLE 7
THE AV FOR THE TEN DAYS SURROUNDING THE EX–DIVIDEND DAY
Panel A: Full Sample
Pre–Act

Panel B: High Dividend Yield

Post–Act

Pre–Act

Day

AV (%)

t–stat

AV (%)

t–stat

–5
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5

2.83***
4.96***
2.31
0.78***
12.48***
18.44***
6.05***
13.07***
0.16
–0.42
0.11

2.42
3.10
1.75
0.56
6.98
7.08
2.53
2.53
0.12
–0.20
0.07

7.75***
6.81***
5.51***
4.91***
11.90***
7.72***
2.60**
3.40***
3.08***
1.30
2.44***

5.55
5.00
3.75
3.43
6.01
7.32
2.07
2.84
2.80
1.18
2.28

Post–Act

AV (%)

t–stat

AV (%)

t–stat

2.10
3.12
–0.09
0.60
35.86***
28.62***
3.38
2.82
–1.95
–4.19
–1.53

0.89
1.30
–0.04
0.25
9.79
8.43
1.38
1.05
–0.84
–1.75
–0.66

3.44
0.48
4.24*
9.90***
18.02***
19.83***
0.95
–0.64
2.72
–0.63
–2.64

1.81
0.25
2.10
4.76
8.25
8.36
0.49
–0.32
1.38
–0.34
–1.13

Notes:
AV is deﬁned as the difference between a stock’s actual to average turnover, relative to the average turnover. Daily
turnover is deﬁned as the ratio of daily shares traded to shares outstanding. We compute the average turnover
by using the estimation period [–45, –6] and [6, 45]. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. T–statistics for testing
whether AV is equal to zero are computed using the cross–sectional estimates of the variance of AV. Pre–Act
period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31,
2005. The high dividend yield sample is those stocks with an annualized dividend yield greater than 4%. The
CAV in Figures 4 and 5 is the sum of the AV up to and including that day.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

We also calculate the CAV as the sum of
the AV during the 11–day event window
encompassing the ex–dividend day. We
further separate the sample into low–,
medium– and high–yield dividend paying groups (annual dividend yields less
than or equal to two percent, two to four
percent, and greater than four percent,
respectively). We present the average CAV
for the 11–day event window in Table 8.
For the full sample, the CAV is 27.29 percent before the 2003 Act and 31.53 percent
after the 2003 Act. The difference is not
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. However, when we separate the sample into
low–, medium– and high–yield groups,
the strong positive relation between dividend yield and trading volume becomes
obvious. The magnitude of the CAV for
the low–yield group (3.22 percent) and
the medium–yield group (0.49 percent)
before the 2003 Act is insigniﬁcant from
zero and much lower than that of the
high–yield group (183.14 percent). In the
post–act period, the CAV of the low– and
medium–yield groups increases to 16.44
percent and 34.58 percent, respectively.
But only the change in the medium–yield

on the cum–dividend day (day –1) and
ex–dividend day (day 0) than the other
days. Panel B of Table 7 shows even higher
AV for high dividend yield stocks, which
is consistent with the tax–induced trading
theory. When the dividend yield is high,
the tax beneﬁt of exchanging dividends
and capital gains is greater, thus providing greater motivation for investors to
trade. In the pre–Act period, the high
dividend yield stocks have an average
AV of 35.86 percent on the cum–dividend
day and 28.62 percent on the ex–dividend day. In the post–Act period, the AV
decreases to only 18.02 percent on the
cum–dividend day and 19.83 percent on
the ex–dividend day. Figure 4 depicts the
CAV from days –5 to +5 for the pre– and
post–Act period. The CAV for the pre–
and post–Act period does not exhibit a
pronounced difference for the full sample
of dividend paying firms. Figure 5
depicts the CAV only for the high dividend yield stocks. For the high dividend yield sample, the post–Act period
CAV is lower than that in the pre–Act
period particularly after the cum–dividend day.
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Figure 4.

Cumulative Abnormal Volume

Figure 5.

CAV of High Dividend Yield Group

dividend yield stocks.20 For low– and
medium–yield dividend paying stocks,
most trading may be for non–tax reasons
since a small dividend is not attractive
in terms of tax considerations, however,
investors may time their trading around
the ex–dividend day to capture abnormal
returns. Thus, the effect of the reduction in
tax heterogeneity on tax–motivated trading does not show up in the full sample
results.
We also analyze the effect of risk and
transaction costs on the ex–dividend day

group is statistically signiﬁcant. Alternatively, the CAV of the high–yield group
declines significantly after the 2003
Act to 101.12 percent. These results are
generally consistent with our fourth
hypothesis. With the reduction of the tax
heterogeneity in the market, ex–dividend
day trading volume decreases for high
dividend yield stocks as the tax–induced
motives to trade decrease. However, the
overall trading volume is not signiﬁcantly
different between pre– and post–Act since
most of our sample is low– and medium–
20

If we estimate the full sample without winsorizing the data, we ﬁnd that the overall CAV signiﬁcantly decreases
in the post–Act period. We also estimate AV utilizing the log of turnover as described by Chae (2005), but ﬁnd
that our results are highly sensitive to this adjustment. We note that much of the abnormal trading volume
activity occurs for high dividend yield stocks. Thus, mitigating the effect of the high dividend yield stocks on
abnormal trading volume makes it difﬁcult to draw inferences regarding dividend clienteles. Therefore, we
caution the reader that our results are sensitive to the choice of proxy for abnormal trading volume and the
trimming of volume data.
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TABLE 8
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL VOLUME
Pre–Act

Post–Act

Post–Pre

N

CAV (%)

N

CAV (%)

CAV (%)

Full sample

9,031

27.29***
(4.99)

9,449

31.53***
(7.28)

4.24
(0.61)

Low–yield group

4,094

3.22
(0.44)

4,749

16.44***
(2. 78)

13.22
(1.41)

Medium–yield group

3,673

0.49
(0.06)

3,839

34.58***
(4.90)

34.09***
(3.03)

High–yield group

1,264

183.14***
(10.48)

861

101.12***
(7.22)

–82.03***
(–3.66)

Notes:
The CAV is the sum of the AV during the 11–day event window encompassing the ex–dividend day. Data are
winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. Low dividend yield group has an annualized dividend yield less than or equal
to 2%. High dividend yield group has an annualized dividend yield greater than 4%. The remainder of the
sample is the medium–yield group. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act
period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 9
TESTS OF THE CHANGE IN THE CAV
Intercept
PostDum
Yield
Risk
Beta
Market cap
Sample size
R2

Full Sample

High–Yield Group

Medium–Yield Group

Low–Yield Group

–3.165***
(–15.14)
0.176**
(2.34)
28.419***
(13.18)
–0.018**
(–2.49)
–0.421***
(–6.03)
0.213***
(15.69)

–3.652***
(–5.73)
–0.820***
(–3.21)
28.021***
(5.41)
–0.091**
(–3.15)
–0.890***
(–3.37)
0.338***
(7.54)

–2.848***
(–6.69)
0.334***
(2.74)
–1.609
(–0.16)
0.011
(0.91)
–0.417***
(–3.77)
0.228***
(10.58)

–1.758***
(–5.15)
0.295***
(2.92)
0.092
(0.01)
–0.032***
(–3.44)
–0.316***
(–3.38)
0.139***
(6.95)

18,480
0.0226

2,125
0.0610

7,512
0.0165

8,843
0.0092

Notes:
We test the structural changes in CAV ten days surrounding the ex–dividend day. The dependent variable of the
Ordinary Least Squares model is the CAV. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. Pre–Act period is from February 1,
2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. PostDum = 0 for Pre–Act
period and 1 otherwise. Low–yield group has an annualized dividend yield less than or equal to 2%. High–yield
group has an annualized dividend yield greater than 4%. The remainder of the sample is the medium–yield group.
Dividend yield is calculated by dividing the dividend amount by the cum–dividend day closing price. Risk is measured by the variance of a security’s return scaled by the variance of the market return during the estimation period
[–25, –6] and [6, 25]. Beta is obtained from the OLS market model. Market cap is the natural logarithm of the
market capitalization on the cum–dividend day (i.e., cum–dividend day price multiplied by the outstanding
shares). T–statistics for testing the difference from zero are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

trading volume. Following Michaely
and Vila (1996), we regress CAV on
dividend yield, idiosyncratic risk, beta,
market capitalization, and a post–Act
dummy variable for the full sample and
each of the three dividend yield groups.

Results are shown in Table 9. We ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant negative relation between
idiosyncratic risk and trading volume for
high– and low–yield stocks, but an insigniﬁcant relation between idiosyncratic
risk and trading volume for medium–
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yield stocks.21 The coefﬁcients of beta are
signiﬁcantly negative for all groups, consistent with the ﬁnding of Michaely and
Vila (1996). Also the coefﬁcient on market
capitalization is positive and signiﬁcant
in all specifications that is consistent
with the prediction that transaction costs
decrease trading volume. In addition,
we ﬁnd the dividend yield effect is only
signiﬁcant for the high–yield sample and
the full sample. The cumulative trading
volume for high dividend yield stocks signiﬁcantly declines after the 2003 Act even
after controlling for risk, transaction costs,
and market risk, indicated by the signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on the post–Act
dummy variable: –0.820. In general, our
results support a positive relation between
trading volume and dividend yield, a
negative relation between trading volume
and risk, and a negative relation between
trading volume and transaction costs as
predicted by the fourth hypothesis, but
our results appear to be driven by high
dividend paying stocks.

capital gains does affect ex–dividend day
price and trading behavior. We ﬁnd that
the ex–dividend day PDR increases and
the excess return decreases in the post–Act
period.
We also find evidence that overall
dividend clienteles weaken after the
2003 Act as evidenced by a decrease in
the relation between the dividend yield
and the ex–dividend day PDR (or excess
return). Consistent with the trading clientele theory, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of
transaction costs on the ex–dividend day
PDR and excess returns, and a signiﬁcant
effect of risk on the PDR. As the tax heterogeneity among investors is reduced after
the Act, tax–motivated trading around the
ex–dividend day declines signiﬁcantly for
high dividend yield stocks. We also ﬁnd
that trading volume is negatively related
to risk and transaction costs and positively related to dividend yield although
the result appears to be driven by high
dividend yield stocks. We interpret our
results to be generally consistent with
the dynamic trading clientele model of
Michaely and Vila (1995). The ex–dividend day stock price and trading behavior
is jointly affected by relative taxation of
dividend versus capital gains, risk, and
transaction costs. Given that the 2003 Act
only affects the relative tax rates for individual investors, our results suggest that
individual investors play an important
role in ex–dividend day price formation
and trading activities.

CONCLUSION
The paper examines the effect of the
2003 Act on investor behavior. The net
effect of the 2003 Act was to align the tax
rates on capital gains and dividends for
individual investors, whereas previously
individual investors paid a higher rate on
dividend income relative to capital gains.
We ﬁnd that more corporations tend to
pay dividends in the post–Act period.
We also ﬁnd that dividend paying ﬁrms
increased the amount of dividends per
share, but the dividend yield tends to
decrease in the post–Act period. Analyzing tax relevance versus tax irrelevance
on ex–dividend day market behavior, our
ﬁndings support the tax–based view that
the relative taxation of dividends versus
21
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If we estimate Table 9 for the full sample of ﬁrms without restricting the sample to dividend payers in all four
years, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relation between idiosyncratic risk and trading volume in all four
speciﬁcations.

125

NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
Chetty, Raj, Joseph Rosenberg, and
Emmanuel Saez.
“The Effect of Taxes on Market Responses
to Dividend Announcements and Payments:
What Can We Learn from the 2003 Dividend
Tax Cut?” In Taxing Corporate Income in the
21st Century, edited by Alan J. Auerbach,
James R. Hines, and Joel Slemrod, 1–35.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007.
Cloyd, C. Bryan, Oliver Zhen Li, and Connie
D. Weaver.
“Ticks and Tax: the Joint Effects of Price
Discreteness and Taxation on Ex–dividend
Day Returns.” Journal of the American
Taxation Association 28, No. 2 (Fall, 2006):
23–46.
Dhaliwal, Dan, and Oliver Zhen Li.
“Investor Tax Heterogeneity and Ex–dividend Day Trading Volume.” Journal of
Finance 61 No. 1 (February, 2006): 463–90.
Eades, Kenneth M., Patrick J. Hess, and E.
Han Kim.
“On Interpreting Security Returns during
the Ex–dividend Period.” Journal of Financial
Economics 13 No. 1 (March, 1984): 3–34.
Elton, Edwin J., and Martin J. Gruber.
“Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates and the
Clientele Effect.” Review of Economics and
Statistics 52 No. 1 (February, 1970): 68–74.
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, and
Christopher R. Blake.
“Marginal Stockholder Tax Effects and Ex–
dividend Day Price Behavior: Evidence from
Taxable Versus Nontaxable Closed–End
Funds.” Review of Economics and Statistics
87 No. 3 (August, 2005): 579–86.
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, and
Joel Rentzler.
“The Ex–Dividend Day Behavior of Stock
Prices; A Re–Examination of Clientele Effect: A Comment.” Journal of Finance 39 No.
2 (June, 1984): 551–6.
Frank, Murray, and Ravi Jagannathan.
“Why Do Stock Prices Drop by Less than
the Value of the Dividend? Evidence from
a Country without Taxes.” Journal of Financial Economics 47 No. 2 (February, 1998):
161–88.

REFERENCES

Amromin, Gene, Paul Harrison, and Steven
Sharpe.
“How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?” FRB of Chicago Working
Paper No. 2006–17. Chicago, IL: Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2006.
Auerbach, Alan J., and Kevin A. Hassett.
“Dividend Taxes and Firm Valuation: New
Evidence.” American Economic Review 96 No.
2 (May, 2006): 119–23.
Bali, Rakesh, and Gailen L. Hite.
“Ex Dividend Day Stock Price Behavior:
Discreteness or Tax–Induced Clienteles?”
Journal of Financial Economics 47 No. 2 (February, 1998): 127–59.
Barclay, Michael J.
“Dividends, Taxes, and Common Stock
Prices: the Ex–dividend Day Behavior of
Common Stock Prices before the Income
Tax.” Journal of Financial Economics 19 No. 1
(September, 1987): 31–44.
Bell, Leonie, and Tim Jenkinson.
“New Evidence of the Impact of Dividend
Taxation and on the Identity of the Marginal
Investor.” Journal of Finance 57 No. 3 (June,
2002): 1321–46.
Boyd, John H., and Ravi Jagannathan.
“Ex–dividend Price Behavior of Common
Stocks.” Review of Financial Studies 7 No. 4
(Winter, 1994): 711–41.
Campbell, James A., and Willam Beranek.
“Stock Price Behavior on Ex–dividend
Dates.” Journal of Finance 10 No. 4 (December, 1955): 425–29.
Chae, Joon.
“Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry,
and Timing Information.” Journal of Finance
60 No. 1 (February, 2005): 413–42.
Chay, J. B., Dosoung Choi, and Jeffrey Pontiff.
“Market Valuation of Tax–Timing Options:
Evidence from Capital Gains Distributions.”
Journal of Finance 61 No. 2 (April, 2006):
837–65.
Chetty, Raj, and Emmanuel Saez.
“The Effect of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
on Corporate Behavior: Interpreting the
Evidence.” American Economic Review 96 No.
2 (May, 2006): 124–9.
126

Ex–Dividend Day Price and Volume: The Case of 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
Michaely, Roni, and Maurizio Murgia.
“The Effect of Tax Heterogeneity on Prices
and Volume around the Ex–dividend Day:
Evidence from the Milan Stock Exchange.”
The Review of Financial Studies 8 No. 2 (Summer, 1995): 369–99.
Michaely, Roni.
“Ex–Dividend Day Stock–Price Behavior:
The Case of the 1986 Tax–Reform Act.”
Journal of Finance 46 No. 3 (July, 1991): 845–
59.
Michaely, Roni, and Jean–Luc Vila.
“Investors’ Heterogeneity, Prices, and Volume around the Ex–dividend Day.” Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30 No.
2 (June, 1995): 171–98.
Michaely, Roni, and Jean–Luc Vila.
“Trading Volume with Private Valuation:
Evidence from the Ex–dividend Day.” The
Review of Financial Studies 9 No. 2 (Summer,
1996): 471–509.
Miller, Merton H., and Franco Modigliani.
“Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares.” Journal of Business 34 No. 4
(October, 1961): 411–33.
Naranjo, Andy, M. Nimalendran, and Mike
Ryngaert.
“Time Variation of Ex–dividend Day Stock
Returns and Corporate Dividend Capture:
A Reexamination.” Journal of Finance 55 No.
5 (October, 2000): 2357–72.
Poterba, James M., and Lawrence H. Summers.
“New Evidence that Taxes Affect the Valuation of Dividends.” Journal of Finance 39 No.
5 (December, 1984): 1397–415.
Robin, Ashok J.
“The Impact of the 1986 Tax–Reform Act
on Ex–Dividend Day Returns.” Financial
Management 20 No. 1 (Spring, 1991): 60–70.
Wu, Chunchi, and Junming Hsu.
“The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform on
Ex–dividend Day Volume and Price Behavior.” National Tax Journal 49 No. 2 (June,
1996): 177–92.

Graham, John R., Roni Michaely, and
Michael R. Roberts.
“Do Price Discreteness and Transactions
Costs Affect Stock Returns? Comparing
Ex–dividend Pricing before and after
Decimalization.” Journal of Finance 58 No. 6
(December, 2003): 2611–35.
Howton, Shelly W., and Shawn D. Howton.
“The Corporate Response to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut.” Journal of Applied Finance 16
No. 1 (Spring/Summer, 2006): 62–71.
Jakob, Keith, and Tongshu Ma.
“Tick Size, NYSE Rule 118, and Ex–dividend Day Stock Price Behavior.” Journal of
Financial Economics 72 No. 3 (June, 2004):
605–25.
Kalay, Avner.
“The Ex–dividend Day Behavior of Stock
Prices: A Re–examination of the Clientele
Effect.” Journal of Finance 37 No. 4 (September, 1982): 1059–70.
Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Ralph A. Walkling.
“Short Term Trading around Ex–dividend
Days: Additional Evidence.” Journal of
Financial Economics 21 No. 2 (September,
1988): 291–98.
Koski, Jennifer Lynch.
“A Microstructure Analysis of Ex–dividend
Stock Price Behavior before and after the
1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts.” Journal of
Business 69 No. 3 (July, 1996): 313–38.
Lakonishok, Josef, and Theo Vermaelen.
“Tax Reform and Ex–dividend Day Behaviour.” Journal of Finance 38 No. 4 (September,
1983): 1157–79.
Lamdin, Douglas J., and Craig Hiemstra.
“Ex–Dividend Day Share Price Behavior:
Effects of the Tax–Reform Act of 1986.”
Review of Economics and Statistics 75 No. 4
(November, 1993): 778–83.
Lasfer, M. Ameziane.
“Ex–Day Behavior—Tax or Short–Term
Trading Effects.” Journal of Finance 50 No. 3
(July, 1995): 875–97.

127

